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Abstract 
Natural selection has produced not only fixed adaptive traits in response to enduring 
environments, but also contingencies capable of yielding variable outcomes in variable 
environments. A well-known example is phenotypic plasticity, which entails alternative 
developmental outcomes in different environments. Here, we focus on more immediate and 
transitory behavioral plasticity (underpinned by motivational processes), and we suggest that 
the physiological concept of homeostasis offers a coherent perspective for studying human 
motivations and associated behavioral processes. We further propose the asymmetric 
behavioral homeostasis hypothesis, which conceptualizes many motivational processes as 
one-sided homeostatic mechanisms and which predicts that motivational responses that are 
amplified by certain cues will not be reversed simply by reversing the input cues. An 
important implication is that many evolutionarily adaptive—albeit subjectively and socially 
deleterious—responses to fitness threats (e.g., fears, aversions) are more easily inflamed than 
dampened. We review literature bearing on this hypothesis and discuss implications for 
psychology. 
Keywords: motivation; homeostasis; feedback control; negativity bias 
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The Asymmetric Behavioral Homeostasis Hypothesis: 
Unidirectional Flexibility of Fundamental Motivational Processes 
 Biological evolution is about adapting to environments. At the simplest level, 
organisms possessing heritable traits that confer a reproductive advantage (e.g., superior 
visual acuity) out-reproduce those possessing inferior variants, resulting in the propagation of 
evolved adaptations over generations (G. C. Williams, 1966). Adaptability can also be 
programmed into individual organisms (Gluckman, Beedle, & Hanson, 2009; Penke, 2009). 
When environments are predictably variable across generations, the capacity for phenotypic 
plasticity can evolve, allowing organisms to adaptively alter their traits in response to 
alternative environments (e.g., for clownfish, sex is not prenatally determined but is 
contingent on the social environment; Buston, 2003). As a result, genetic clones can end up 
with vastly different phenotypes, at least for a period, each better adapted to its own 
particular environment (Pigliucci, 2001). Operating at an even briefer timescale of 
environmental variability and adaptability is the capacity for homeostasis, the ability of 
organisms to maintain adaptive states (e.g., body temperature) by responding quickly—via 
endocrine and neural responses—to disturbances, enabling adaptability with greater temporal 
precision (Widmaier, Raff, & Strang, 2008).1 In this article, we argue that the concept of 
behavioral homeostasis offers a coherent perspective for the study of human motivations and 
associated processes. 
 The concept of evolved adaptations is familiar to most psychologists, largely through 
the efforts of evolutionary psychologists (Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby 1992; Buss, 2005). 
Phenotypic plasticity is also familiar to many—whenever researchers investigate effects of 
external events on long-term outcomes (e.g., learning), they are often investigating 
phenotypic plasticity. In recent decades, evolutionarily informed research on phenotypic 
plasticity in humans has proliferated, generating a rich body of work (e.g., Belsky, Steinberg, 
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& Draper, 1991; Bjorklund & Pellegrini, 2000; Del Giudice, 2009). The concept of 
homeostasis is, on the other hand, foreign to most psychologists, apart from those 
specializing in biological psychology. This is understandable, since the most familiar 
examples of homeostasis include thermoregulation, fluid balance, blood glucose regulation, 
and other physiological processes that fall outside the scope of most areas of psychology. 
However, motivational processes—which are central in psychology—share a key underlying 
mechanism with homeostasis: negative-feedback control.2 Indeed, it could be argued that 
psychologists have been investigating behavioral homeostasis for a long time. Whenever 
researchers investigate effects of experimental manipulations on functional psychological and 
behavioral outcomes, they may be investigating components of behavioral homeostasis—
behavioral mechanisms designed to maintain adaptive states. 
 We have three main objectives: (a) delineate the concept of behavioral homeostasis; 
(b) offer a theoretical perspective from which we derive the general hypothesis that 
behavioral homeostatic responses are often asymmetric, being under stricter control in one 
direction (and looser control in the other); and (c) review evidence from the psychological 
literature pertaining to this hypothesis. We aim to demonstrate that the concept of 
homeostasis and the hypothesis of asymmetric behavioral homeostasis offer a synthesis of 
known psychological phenomena, as well as a more biologically principled means by which 
functional hypotheses can be generated and psychological theories advanced. 
Negative-Feedback Control, Homeostasis, and Psychology 
 The thermostat has served as a textbook example of the negative-feedback loop (see 
Carver & Scheier, 1998; Marken, 2009). Negative-feedback control systems are not just feats 
of human engineering; they are very common in nature, and they constitute the main 
mechanism underlying homeostasis. For organisms to function optimally, many variables 
must be kept in an adaptively steady state. For example, our bodies work best with a certain 
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amount of water (reference value). When we are deprived of water (disturbance), a 
regulatory mechanism engenders functional responses, including the experience of thirst 
(output). These output responses lead to drinking behavior. The actual fluid level (controlled 
variable) is then fed back and compared against the reference value, and as the discrepancy 
between the two decreases, the functional output responses become attenuated. Such 
homeostatic mechanisms underlie many of our familiar bodily responses to environmental 
events: After a period of fasting, we feel hungry; when we enter a sauna, we perspire; when 
we run, our hearts race. In each of these (simplified) examples, the bodily response is the 
output that is triggered by a disturbance in order to keep an important variable—energy and 
nutrition levels, body temperature, blood oxygen level—within an adaptive range. In 
psychology, negative-feedback control has been invoked in descriptions of human 
motivations and perceptions (Bargh, Gollwitzer, & Oettingen, 2010; Cziko, 2000). From an 
evolutionary perspective, human motivations have been described as systems that regulate 
“internal regulatory variables,” a concept which includes but extends beyond homeostatically 
controlled variables (Tooby, Cosmides, Sell, Lieberman, & Sznycer, 2008). The notion of 
feedback control has also been incorporated into cognitive models of increasingly abstract 
goals hierarchically layered upon lower-order goals (Carver & Scheier, 1990, 1998; Powers, 
1973). 
 Notably, no previous treatment has considered the possibility of directional 
asymmetries in responses to disturbances. All previous discussions invoking the thermostat-
like negative-feedback control have assumed that upward and downward deviations in the 
controlled variable (e.g., temperature) lead to equivalent output responses—that deviations in 
both directions are under equally strict control. Below, we explain why this may rarely be the 
case in behavioral homeostasis. 
Directional Asymmetry in Homeostatic Control 
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 When we consider thermostat-regulated systems in the real world, directional 
asymmetry is actually quite common. Dwellings in colder regions (e.g., Northern Europe) 
tend to be equipped with heating systems, but not cooling systems. The thermostat works by 
turning on the heat when the room temperature falls below the desired temperature; if the 
room temperature happens to exceed the desired temperature, the system does nothing and 
only natural cooling can occur. Given the rarity of intolerably hot days in these regions, the 
inhabitants appear willing to endure a few uncomfortably hot days if it saves them the costs 
associated with maintaining a cooling system as well. On the flipside, dwellings in hotter 
regions (e.g., the Middle East) tend be to equipped with cooling systems, but not heating 
systems.3 In either case, equivalent warming and cooling disturbances do not engender 
equivalent opposing output responses in the temperature-regulation system. The thermostat 
model, typically conveyed with symmetrical bidirectional responses, has thus been obscuring 
a key qualifying feature of feedback-control mechanisms in the real world. 
 Crucially, these considerations apply to homeostasis as well. First, physiological 
disturbances can occur in two directions (e.g., blood glucose level that becomes too high or 
too low), and functional responses can theoretically occur in two directions to oppose those 
disturbances (e.g., the release of hormones that regulate blood glucose levels). Second, like 
separate heating and cooling systems, bidirectional homeostatic responses are likely to 
require two distinct (albeit integrated) systems (e.g., there are distinct endocrine mechanisms 
for decreasing and increasing blood glucose levels). Third, physiological costs associated 
with upward and downward deviations can differ substantially (e.g., hypoglycemia 
[abnormally low blood glucose] poses a more immediate threat to survival than does 
hyperglycemia [excessive blood glucose]; Pocock, Richards, & Richards, 2013). Finally, if 
the costs of upward and downward deviations are asymmetric, and if the organic costs 
associated with maintaining a perfectly designed bidirectional system are greater than the 
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costs of tolerating the less costly deviation, the homeostatic system may be designed to be 
asymmetric, with one component relatively underdeveloped or readily overwhelmed by its 
counterpart (e.g., the human body tends to tolerate hyperglycemia more than hypoglycemia). 
 In short, where the two deviations are associated with asymmetric costs, natural 
selection may produce an asymmetric homeostatic system with looser control over the less 
costly deviation—a system that is largely or entirely unidirectional. We propose that many 
behavioral homeostatic processes conceptually resemble temperature-regulation systems with 
just a heating (or just a cooling) system. Thus, even when symmetrical disturbances (upward 
and downward deviations) are introduced, the output responses may not be symmetrical. We 
refer to this as the asymmetric behavioral homeostasis hypothesis.4 
Theoretical Background and Empirical Implications 
 To give due credit, the present asymmetry hypothesis has precursors in previous 
theory and research. Most notably, Kahneman and Tversky (1984) described asymmetries in 
how humans perceive benefits and costs. According to their prospect theory, humans’ 
subjective valuation of costs (losses) and benefits (gains) is usually asymmetric, as described 
by a steeper curve for losses than gains in the S-shaped value function. That is, people exhibit 
loss aversion, where a loss of X units is more aversive than a gain of X units is appetitive. 
Applying this concept more broadly, other researchers have noted the existence of a broader 
positive–negative asymmetry across psychological phenomena, with the negative tending to 
overpower the positive (e.g., Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Peeters & 
Czapinski, 1990). Baumeister et al. (2001) invoked evolutionary reasons for this fundamental 
asymmetry: “Organisms that were better attuned to bad things would have been more likely 
to survive threats and, consequently, would have increased probability of passing along their 
genes” (p. 325). In a similar vein, Rozin and Royzman (2001) noted that negative events tend 
to overpower positive ones, focusing especially on biologically grounded phenomena (e.g., 
ASYMMETRIC BEHAVIORAL HOMEOSTASIS 8 
 
negative contamination, learning). Like Baumeister et al., Rozin and Royzman appealed to 
evolution to supply the ultimate explanation for the negativity bias. Finally, Nesse (2005) and 
Haselton and Nettle (2006) offered analyses, also explicitly evolutionary, focusing on 
functional biases in signal detection situations; their perspectives offer explanations for 
(functionally) erroneous responses in ambiguous situations; their key lesson for the present 
discussion is that it is better to err on the side of caution (see also Eiser & Fazio, 2008). 
While the present perspective conceptually overlaps with these previous approaches, it makes 
a key theoretical advance. None of these previous approaches pertain specifically to 
feedback-regulated motivations underlying goal-directed behavior. Thus, none of them 
implies the specific hypothesis that equal and opposite inputs to motivational systems will 
often lead to asymmetric outputs. 
 The asymmetric behavioral homeostasis hypothesis implies more strictly regulated 
homeostatic responses to more costly deviations, which will generally be those signaling 
impending losses and threats (as opposed to deviations signaling gains and opportunities). 
Psychologically, stricter regulation means more urgent motives and behaviors. For many 
adaptive processes, what is often critical is maintaining a sufficient level of a variable, for 
example, consuming enough food and water to survive, or maintaining a safe buffer (e.g., 
physical distance) against threat. This is because, for a number of variables such as energy 
and fluid levels, the costs of substantial deviation downwards from the adaptive level 
(deprivation) often exceed the costs of commensurate deviation upwards from the optimal 
level (overconsumption). This may explain why humans have evolved to experience intense 
hunger and thirst, but have not evolved equally urgent motivational states following 
overconsumption of food and water. The body does deal with excess food and water via 
waste elimination, but there are no motivational states comparable to hunger and thirst that 
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drive deviation-reducing behavior toward a goal (the feeling of overfullness is not a 
commensurate counterpart to the feeling of hunger). 
 Similarly, survival often depends on being sufficiently distant from threats, which 
may explain why threat-related emotions are more ubiquitous and powerful than safety-
related emotions (Baumeister et al., 2001). As a specific example, if there is a safe distance 
that one must maintain from a venomous snake—say, 2 meters—deviation in which that 
distance is reduced is more costly than an equivalent deviation in the opposite direction. Thus, 
a change that reduces this distance is expected to impel behavior (perhaps via increased fear) 
that restores the 2-meter buffer, but a change that increases the distance is not expected to 
impel behavior (via decreased fear or via some other motivational state) that reins in the 
distance back to 2 meters. To the extent that fear is involved in regulating the 2 meter buffer 
against snakes, a reduction in the distance (e.g., to 1 meter) is expected to increase fear 
(demonstrating homeostatic control), but an equivalent increase in the distance (e.g., to 3 
meters) is not expected to lead to a commensurate decrease in fear (demonstrating less strict 
homeostatic control). 
Asymmetric Behavioral Homeostasis and Experimental Psychology 
 Many psychological theories and findings may be interpreted through the lens of 
asymmetric behavioral homeostasis. Indeed, any theory or model that specifies a need to 
maintain a sufficient level of X (or maintain a sufficiently low level of X, in the case of 
harmful stimuli such as toxins) lends itself to being couched in terms of asymmetric 
behavioral homeostasis. Testing the asymmetry hypothesis is analogous to testing whether a 
thermostat-regulated home is equipped with both heating and cooling systems (rather than 
just one of them). Thus, with regard to motivation, a rigorous test of the asymmetry 
hypothesis would require manipulations introducing symmetrical bidirectional 
disturbances—which, in principle, could both increase and decrease the motivational state 
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from the baseline. Not surprisingly, however, tests of motivational hypotheses have focused 
on trying to stimulate the motivational states above the baseline, rather than on trying to 
depress them below the baseline; thus, the latter tests are nearly absent in the literature. And 
even if the latter type of studies had been conducted widely, they are less likely to have 
yielded measurable effects on motivational states—if the asymmetry hypothesis is valid. It’s 
difficult to ascertain the extent to which such tests have been conducted (as null findings are 
less likely to have been published). In any case, if abundant research shows that motivational 
states can be amplified but little research shows that motivational states can be dampened, 
this would be telling. 
 Below, we review the relevant literature by discussing specific theories/models and 
associated findings. The coverage is not intended to be exhaustive, but illustrative. The 
review is organized around three fundamental needs and motives (see Table 1) associated 
with survival and reproduction (cf. Kenrick, Griskevicius, Neuberg, & Schaller, 2010; Nesse, 
2005). 
Maintaining a Buffer against Pathogens 
 The well-being of organisms is constantly threatened by pathogens, and organisms 
have responded to this evolutionary pressure, as evidenced by the vertebrate immune system. 
Recently, a psychological defense system has been described as well. Referred to as the 
behavioral immune system, it appears that animals possess a set of behavioral mechanisms 
(undergirded by perceptual, cognitive, and motivational mechanisms) that facilitate 
behavioral avoidance of pathogens (Curtis, Aunger, & Rabie, 2004; Oaten, Stevenson, & 
Case, 2009; Schaller & Park, 2011). Because humans are group-living, and because many 
diseases are transmitted between individuals, humans are likely to have evolved 
psychological mechanisms that facilitate identification and avoidance of disease carriers. 
These mechanisms—encompassing contamination cognitions, disgust, negative attitudes—
ASYMMETRIC BEHAVIORAL HOMEOSTASIS 11 
 
appear to contribute to avoidance and exclusion of individuals perceived to harbor pathogens, 
such as people with morphological abnormalities and members of culturally foreign 
outgroups (Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Schaller & Neuberg, 2012). 
 It can be argued that the behavioral immune system acts to maintain a buffer between 
organisms and apparent sources of pathogens. Thus, when a disturbance reduces that buffer, 
output responses that serve to restore the buffer may become activated. A common research 
strategy has involved making predictions about functional output responses in specific 
situations and then testing whether the output response increases above the baseline when a 
disease-vulnerability disturbance (e.g., visual reminder of contagious diseases) is introduced. 
Studies have generated ample evidence for such an effect (Ackerman et al., 2009; Faulkner, 
Schaller, Park & Duncan, 2004; Miller & Maner, 2012; Mortensen, Becker, Ackerman, 
Neuberg, & Kenrick, 2010; Navarrete & Fessler, 2006; Park, Faulkner, & Schaller, 2003; 
Park, Schaller, & Crandall, 2007; Reid et al., 2012). Disturbances that impinge on the 
pathogen buffer activate buffer-restoring responses. 
 If heightened subjective vulnerability amplifies buffer-restoring output responses, one 
might expect heightened subjective invulnerability to dampen the same output responses. 
Indeed, invoking such a hypothesis, Schaller, Park, and Faulkner (2003) suggested that 
disease-based prejudice might just as easily be decreased: “Interventions designed to reduce 
individuals’ real or imagined risk of contracting infectious diseases may therefore help to 
reduce this particular prejudice” (p. 133). By contrast, the asymmetry hypothesis suggests 
that because deviation toward an inflated buffer (e.g., feeling especially invulnerable to 
disease) is simply not as consequential as deviation toward an insufficient buffer (e.g., feeling 
especially vulnerable to disease), an invulnerability disturbance is not expected to be strictly 
regulated—that is, heightened invulnerability may lead to few or no output responses. 
Therefore, experiments testing whether a disease-invulnerability manipulation can reduce 
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responses such as negative attitudes (compared to a baseline control condition) are 
hypothesized to yield weaker or negligible effects. 
 To our knowledge, only one set of published studies has come close to testing the 
effects of a disease-invulnerability disturbance on output responses. Huang, Sedlovskaya, 
Ackerman, and Bargh (2011) tested whether “experiences with two forms of disease 
protection (vaccination and hand washing) are capable of attenuating the relationship 
between concerns about disease and prejudice against out-groups” (p. 1551). They conducted 
Study 1 during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, recruiting both individuals who had and had not 
been vaccinated. These participants were randomly assigned to either a disease-threat 
condition or a no-threat control condition. The dependent variable was a measure of attitudes 
toward immigrants. Huang et al. had predicted that, following a disease-threat manipulation, 
people who had received vaccination would express less prejudice than those who had not. 
Comparison of vaccinated and unvaccinated participants in the disease-threat condition did 
reveal the predicted difference. Importantly, their data also permit a test of whether disease 
invulnerability actually reduces prejudice compared to the baseline. For this test, the relevant 
comparison is that between vaccinated and unvaccinated participants in the control 
condition—this comparison can address whether an inflated buffer directly leads to a 
reduction in the relevant output response. Their results showed no significant difference 
between these two groups (if anything, there was a trend indicating greater prejudice among 
those vaccinated). Thus, although vaccination appeared to inhibit prejudice under disease 
threat, it did not straightforwardly reduce prejudice. Huang et al. conducted two additional 
studies. Study 2 did not have a baseline control condition, which does not permit the key 
comparison. In Study 3, protection was manipulated via random assignment to a hand-
cleaning versus control condition. The most relevant result for the present discussion was the 
lack of a main effect of the hand-cleaning manipulation—that is, the disease invulnerability 
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manipulation did not reduce prejudice when compared against the baseline. The bottom line 
from Haung et al.’s research is that a disease-invulnerability disturbance (receiving 
vaccination, cleaning hands) does not actually reverse the output response (prejudice is not 
reduced compared to the baseline). But it can inhibit what would otherwise have been a 
prejudicial response, suggesting that protective interventions can potentially cancel out 
transient effects of disease salience. 
 In sum, the behavioral immune system is expected to prioritize the maintenance of a 
safe buffer against sources of pathogens, operating in a manner consistent with asymmetric 
behavioral homeostasis. When the buffer is reduced, the system is expected to activate 
disease-avoidance output responses (cognitions, emotions, motives) that serve to restore the 
buffer (i.e., there is strict homeostatic control). Under conditions of an inflated buffer, the 
asymmetry hypothesis predicts fewer and weaker output responses (i.e., there is little 
homeostatic control). The available data are consistent with the asymmetry hypothesis, 
although further research is needed. 
Maintaining a Buffer against Dangerous People and Animals 
 Another recurrent evolutionary problem for humans (and prehuman species) has been 
the possibility of physical harm at the hands and claws of predatory people and animals. 
Given the immediacy of this sort of threat, it is not surprising that it has shaped some of the 
most urgent motivational states and behaviors (commonly referred to as “fight or flight 
response”), involving dedicated brain circuits (LeDoux, 2000) and specific perceptual, 
cognitive, and motivational mechanisms (Barrett, 2005). Fear appears to be the key emotion, 
and research has identified learning biases that facilitate quick acquisition of associations 
between danger-relevant animals and fear responses (Barrett & Broesch, 2012; Öhman and 
Mineka, 2001). In humans, such learning biases have been found to extend to social targets as 
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well (Navarrete et al., 2009, 2012). Here, we focus on the threat of interpersonal violence, 
particularly threat posed by members of coalitional outgroups (Schaller & Neuberg, 2012). 
 From the behavioral homeostasis perspective, it can be argued that these danger-
avoidance mechanisms serve to maintain a buffer against potentially dangerous people. Thus, 
when a disturbance reduces that buffer, output responses that serve to restore the buffer are 
expected to be observed. The output responses comprise a wide range of psychological 
responses, including fear, danger-relevant cognitions, and increased negative attitudes toward 
danger-relevant social targets. The asymmetry hypothesis predicts that while a disturbance 
that reduces the buffer will trigger an output response that restores the buffer, a disturbance 
that makes people feel especially safe will have little effect. 
As an important aside, one might argue that it would be more adaptive to strive for 
maximization of safety rather than an “optimal set point.” However, there is a problem with 
such a maximization motivation. A motivation system that strives for maximum safety would 
be an open-ended system, with no environmental stimuli that could deactivate the 
motivation—the motivation would be insatiable (Szechtman & Woody, 2004). An individual 
motivated to achieve maximum safety (e.g., distance from predators) would thus be unable to 
engage in many adaptive behaviors such as eating, sleeping, and mating. Indeed, this kind of 
situation may describe obsessive–compulsive disorder. Researchers in this area have argued 
that humans possess a security-motivation mechanism that involves negative-feedback 
processes (i.e., engaging in precautionary or safety behaviors typically triggers an emotional 
response that reduces security motivations) and that obsessive–compulsive disorder may be 
the result of a failure in negative-feedback control (Szechtman & Woody, 2004).5 
 Consistent with the unidirectional homeostatic control predicted for costly deviations, 
across a number of studies, danger-connoting cues (e.g., ambient darkness, fear-inducing 
movie clip, news about terrorism) have been found to exert vigilance-amplifying effects that 
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may be understood as buffer-restoring output responses—specifically, stronger tendencies to 
ascribe anger to the faces of neutrally expressive outgroup members (Maner et al., 2005), 
functional shifts in perceptions and cognitions with respect to outgroups associated with 
danger-connoting characteristics (Becker et al., 2010; Schaller & Abeysinghe, 2006; Schaller, 
Park, & Mueller, 2003), increased prejudicial attitudes toward outgroups (Das, Bushman, 
Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen, 2009), and quickened avoidance responses to outgroup 
targets (Miller, Zielaskowski, Maner, & Plant, 2012). More broadly, various theoretical 
approaches to discriminate sociality have highlighted the impact of perceived threats, 
including the threat of direct physical harm (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Schaller & Neuberg, 
2012). Essentially, research has found that a wide range of evolutionarily functional (albeit 
socially deleterious) responses can be amplified via the introduction of danger-connoting 
cues. These responses may result in the restoration of the danger-avoidance buffer, evidenced 
by preparatory cognitive shifts or actual behavioral avoidance. 
 An assumption of symmetrical responses predicts that the vigilance-related 
psychological responses may be reversed by interventions designed to make people feel 
especially invulnerable to danger. On the other hand, the asymmetry hypothesis predicts 
weaker or negligible psychological responses to a danger-invulnerability disturbance. We 
identified one experiment bearing on this issue (although we should note that the specific 
motive under investigation had to do with acquiring and maintaining resources, not physical 
safety). Rodeheffer, Hill, and Lord (2012, Study 2) investigated ingroup/outgroup 
categorization of ambiguous faces under a particular type of threat. Specifically, White 
participants categorized biracial faces as White or Black, following a resource-scarcity prime 
or a resource-abundance prime; there was also a neutral control condition. To the extent that 
the exclusion of potential outgroup members from the ingroup serves a protective function, 
one may expect threats to the ingroup to heighten the tendency to be exclusive, resulting in 
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more of the ambiguous faces being categorized as Black. This is exactly what Rodeheffer et 
al. found—the resource-scarcity prime led to heightened exclusivity (“seeing” more of the 
faces as Black). With regard to the asymmetry hypothesis, the key question is whether the 
resource-abundance prime led participants to be extra inclusive compared to the baseline, 
resulting in more of the ambiguous faces being categorized as White. The results showed no 
difference between the resource-abundance prime and the control conditions. The authors did 
not explain this null effect, but it’s fully consistent with asymmetric behavioral homeostasis. 
 In sum, mechanisms for avoiding dangerous people (and animals) are expected to 
prioritize maintaining a buffer against threatening targets. When the buffer is breached, the 
mechanisms are expected to activate danger-avoidance output responses (cognitions, 
emotions, motives) that serve to restore the buffer (i.e., there is homeostatic control)—and 
several studies have shown such effects. The little existing evidence is consistent with the 
asymmetry hypothesis. 
Maintaining Social Relationships and Relational Value 
 Humans are said to be “ultrasocial,” a species characterized by “obligatory group 
living,” meaning that individual humans typically could not have survived alone (Richerson 
& Boyd, 1998; West-Eberhard, 1979). Baumeister and Leary (1995) argued that humans 
possess a fundamental need to belong. In many respects, their analysis falls nicely in line 
with the present perspective. There is a controlled variable to be maintained (i.e., 
relationships), and when a disturbance is introduced (e.g., rejection, isolation) it leads to an 
output response (e.g., seeking affiliation). In addition, Baumeister and Leary invoked the 
concept of satiation—the idea that people’s motivation to form social bonds will subside as 
they approach a sufficient level. And they articulated the implication that an excess of social 
affiliation is likely to be less impactful than insufficient social affiliation (specifically, that 
the pursuit of new relationships will have diminishing returns). Thus, although they did not 
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employ the terms homeostasis, feedback, or asymmetry, their perspective is fully compatible 
with asymmetric behavioral homeostasis. 
 Satisfaction of the need to belong likely hinges on a subjective sense of having a 
sufficient number of supportive and lasting relationships. Is there an approximate quantity of 
relationships that humans tend to maintain? Although Baumeister and Leary (1995) did not 
provide specific figures (indicating only that people need “a few” close relationships), others 
have suggested that human social aggregations reveal hierarchical organization (Caporael, 
1997; Dunbar 1998) within which there is a relatively small group of individuals with whom 
one maintains especially close bonds, referred to as the “sympathy group.” Researchers have 
attempted to estimate the size of the sympathy group (e.g., by asking people to list the names 
of people whose death they would find devastating), and they have come up with figures in 
the region of 10–15, plus or minus a handful (e.g., Buys & Larson, 1979; Dunbar & Spoors, 
1995). Not surprisingly, the sympathy group comprises close family and friends, and it is 
these few close bonds that are expected to be regulated by behavioral homeostasis. 
 Research has found that people are highly sensitive to cues of rejection and isolation 
across many social contexts (K. D. Williams, 2007). For instance, experiments have shown 
that minor instances of rejection by strangers kindle people’s desires to affiliate with new 
sources of potential affiliation (Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2007), albeit with 
greater interpersonal wariness (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007). 
Given that the experience of rejection and isolation throughout human evolutionary history is 
likely to have portended a serious setback, this sort of hypersensitivity is not surprising. 
Highly telling is the discovery that the “pain” of social rejection exhibits neurophysiological 
overlaps with the experience of physical pain (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; 
MacDonald & Leary, 2005). 
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 Perhaps the most widely studied psychological phenomenon associated with social 
rejection is self-esteem (the extent to which people value themselves). According to Leary’s 
(1999) sociometer theory, the evolutionary importance of maintaining interpersonal 
relationships may have led to ancestral humans developing “a mechanism for monitoring the 
degree to which other people valued and accepted them” (p. 33), and self-esteem may serve 
that monitoring function. Information suggesting threats to relationships or rejection by 
others may act as a disturbance that leads to the experience of low self-esteem and 
concomitant motives to restore one’s sense of relational value (Leary, 2005). 
 According to the asymmetry hypothesis, experiencing extra relationship security or 
being socially accepted when already sated is not as functionally consequential as 
experiencing threats to relationships or being rejected. Accordingly, the output responses for 
attaining and maintaining relationships (yearning, loneliness, and affiliation motives) are 
expected to be easier to amplify than to dampen. Likewise, to the extent that reduced self-
esteem (i.e., the warning signal from the sociometer) motivates functional behavior, 
decreases in self-esteem (engendered by rejection) should be easier to trigger and typically 
larger in magnitude, compared to increases in self-esteem (engendered by acceptance). For 
most of the output responses, there exist no data bearing on the asymmetry hypothesis (all of 
the studies we have come across have used one-sided manipulations). Also, many tests of 
sociometer theory omitted a baseline control (e.g., Bourgeois & Leary, 2001; Leary, Cottrell, 
& Phillips, 2001; Leary et al., 2003), without which the asymmetry hypothesis cannot be 
evaluated. Other studies included “neutral” conditions (e.g., participants received approval 
scores around the middle of a Likert-type scale) along with approval and disapproval 
conditions (e.g., Buckley, Winkel, & Leary, 2004; Leary, Haupt, Strausser, & Chokel, 1998). 
However, one cannot assume that such neutral conditions are psychologically equivalent to 
baseline controls, because the “neutral” feedback (e.g., being given an approval score around 
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5 on a 1–9 scale) may actually be experienced as mild disapproval.6 Thus, the results from 
such studies are difficult to interpret with respect to the asymmetry hypothesis.7 We identified 
one study with a true baseline control (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995, Study 4). In 
this study, participants first completed a pretest measure of self-esteem and in a later 
experimental session were assigned to an inclusion, exclusion, or no feedback control 
conditions. They then completed the same measure of self-esteem. Leary et al. (1995) 
reported two analyses. One analysis examined only the posttest self-esteem scores across the 
three conditions, and it showed that self-esteem scores in the inclusion condition were higher 
than in the other two conditions, and self-esteem scores in the exclusion and control 
conditions were similar, which contradicts the asymmetry hypothesis. A second analysis 
compared difference scores (posttest – pretest self-esteem scores) across the three conditions. 
This is arguably a more informative test, as it controls for random variations in pretest self-
esteem scores and thus allows a more rigorous examination of how the manipulation shifted 
individuals’ self-esteem scores from their baselines. This analysis showed significant posttest 
reductions in self-esteem scores following exclusion, but no statistically significant changes 
in the inclusion and control conditions. Leary et al. (1995) concluded, “Thus, rejection 
significantly lowered self-feelings, but acceptance did not significantly raise them” (p. 
526)—consistent with the asymmetry hypothesis. 
 In sum, humans possess a set of psychological mechanisms that prioritize the 
maintenance of a sufficient level of social affiliation. When relationships are under threat, the 
mechanisms are expected to activate functional output responses that serve to reinforce or 
repair relationships (e.g., desires to forge new bonds). A large number of studies have 
demonstrated such effects. The asymmetry hypothesis implies that extra relationship security, 
social acceptance, or trust/face building should not have commensurate dampening effects on 
those output responses. At least one experimental finding suggests that the warning signal 
ASYMMETRIC BEHAVIORAL HOMEOSTASIS 20 
 
component of the sociometer is easier to amplify (via exclusion) than to dampen (via 
inclusion). 
Interim Summary 
 For several fundamental motivational processes, behavioral homeostasis offers a 
useful means of identifying the key underlying mechanisms. Furthermore, the asymmetry 
hypothesis predicts that behavioral homeostatic mechanisms should generally be designed to 
maintain above-threshold levels of a variable, with the result that downward deviations are 
responded to more robustly. The few unequivocal tests of the asymmetry hypothesis have 
shown that upward deviations (e.g., disease invulnerability, social acceptance) have no 
effects on the outcome variables compared to the baseline. We would expect future studies to 
show similar patterns. Indeed, it’s possible that many null effects sit in file drawers. As many 
psychologists have experienced, null effects are notoriously difficult to interpret. The present 
perspective offers a theoretically grounded reason to expect null effects in specific situations. 
Additional Issues and Directions for Further Research 
 To be sure, psychologists have been making strides without invoking the concept of 
homeostasis. So our perspective must be sufficiently justified: It must not only provide a 
cogent account of observed phenomena, but also inspire novel questions and further research. 
Below, we identify additional issues for further consideration. 
Homeostasis or Maximization? 
 As noted previously, a possible counterargument to the present perspective is that 
humans do not attempt to maintain sufficient levels of the variables discussed above (distance 
from threat, social relationships), but instead are driven to maximize these variables, as it is 
only beneficial to have more safety and more (or better) relationships. We noted above why 
motives that are geared toward maximization (and thus insatiable) may be dysfunctional. 
Here, we further elaborate on this issue. 
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 It is an evolutionary truism that animals will tend to maximize benefits within existing 
constraints. Importantly, these constraints are what make the systems behave in a 
homeostatic manner. For instance, a motivational system that strives for “infinite” safety 
would be insatiable (as mentioned above, a situation that may describe obsessive–compulsive 
disorder; Szechtman & Woody, 2004). As animals must simultaneously manage multiple 
(often competing) goals, a threat-avoidance motive that is perpetually activated will 
inevitably impose fitness costs by hindering other important goals (such as foraging and 
mating). Therefore, it is improbable that animals have evolved drives to maximize distances 
from threats; rather, they have evolved to be functionally flexible, attending to threats only 
when they begin to impinge on the buffer and must become prioritized. The mechanisms 
described above can thus be said to exhibit the key characteristics of asymmetric behavioral 
homeostasis—the existence of a reference value, strict control over downward deviations, 
and loose (or no) control over upward deviations. 
 Of course, whether a particular motivational process involves homeostatic control or 
maximization is ultimately an empirical issue, and future research may reveal that some 
motivational systems are better explained by maximization (or minimization). For example, 
motivations for social status (Kenrick et al., 2010) may be insatiable, as social status is 
inherently relative and every increase in status may confer incremental benefits. There are 
various empirical approaches to this issue. Behavioral observations in either natural or 
controlled environments might reveal whether animals (including humans) tend to continue 
gathering (and hoarding) a particular resource or buffer (food, safety, etc.). If the relevant 
motivational system is homeostatic, one expects to observe satiation—the animal will stop 
gathering the resource at some point (maximization would be indicated by a continued 
gathering and hoarding of the resource). Furthermore, one might experimentally manipulate a 
resource the animal has in the more costly direction (e.g., reduce safety) and measure 
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subsequent compensatory behavior. In such an experiment, homeostatic control would be 
indicated by efforts to restore the level of the resource to approximately pre-manipulation 
levels, whereas maximization would be indicated by efforts to maximally increase the 
resource. In addition, research on individual differences might yield data consistent with 
homeostatic control. For example, when multiple individuals can obtain resources at similar 
costs, individual differences in gathering resources would be consistent with homeostatic 
control and individual differences in set points (see discussion below on individual 
differences and person × situation interactions). 
Asymmetry and Its Long-Term Implications 
 Even highly adaptive physiological and psychological responses entail costs, so 
natural selection is expected to have shaped homeostatic responses to be only as strict as 
necessary. This is why hyperglycemia occurs more frequently than does hypoglycemia; the 
latter is more strictly controlled and the former more tolerated (Pocock et al., 2013). There 
may be interesting longer-term effects of greater tolerance of the less costly deviation. 
Sometimes, the less costly deviation may, over a longer duration, have cumulative negative 
effects. For instance, chronic hyperglycemia (the defining characteristic of diabetes mellitus) 
does have negative physiological effects (e.g., Brownlee, 2001). In the realm of behavioral 
homeostasis, repeated deviations in the less costly direction may have the effect of altering 
the baseline (the reference value), at least under some circumstances. For instance, while 
recurrent input indicating invulnerability to disease may not precipitate immediate changes in 
motivational responses, it may gradually alter expectations about diseases in the environment 
and possibly expand the buffer that one attempts to maintain. An increased buffer means 
greater reactivity to a wider range of potential disturbances. This would amount to a long-
term change in an individual-difference disposition (e.g., greater pathogen disgust sensitivity) 
or a longer-term shift in societal standards (e.g., increasingly stringent hygiene norms). 
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Individual Differences and Person × Situation Interactions 
 The concept of homeostasis may help clarify person × situation interaction effects, 
which psychologists often rely on to buttress causal arguments. Specifically, to test the 
hypothesis that X has an effect on Y, many researchers will not only experimentally 
manipulate X (high X condition versus low/no X condition), but also measure individual 
differences in a dispositional variable corresponding to X, and they will look for interaction 
effects between the two. An example would be investigating the interactive effect of “state” 
and “trait” anxiety. This practice may increase the odds of uncovering a noteworthy effect, 
because even if the main effect of manipulated-X (e.g., state anxiety) is negligible, there may 
be an interaction effect involving measured-X (e.g., trait anxiety). Interestingly, the literature 
reveals two types of ordinal interaction effects, both of which have been used to justify causal 
conclusions: (a) manipulated-X has no effect on individuals low in measured-X but has an 
effect on individuals high in measured-X (e.g., manipulating state anxiety shows an effect on 
the DV only among participants high in trait anxiety); and (b) manipulated-X has no effect on 
individuals high in measured-X but has an effect on individuals low in measured-X (e.g., 
manipulating state anxiety shows an effect on the DV only among participants low in trait 
anxiety; for examples of studies showing such interactions, see Bushman & Baumeister, 
1998; Maner, Gailliot, Rouby, & Miller, 2007; Maner, Miller, Moss, Leo, & Plant, 2012). 
The first type appears to show that certain individual-difference effects remain dormant 
unless “triggered” by a provocative situation, with the result that the impact of individual 
differences becomes visible only in the experimental (high X) condition. The second type 
appears to show overpowering effects of “strong situations”—individual-difference effects 
manifest under typical circumstances (low/no X condition), but not in the experimental (high 
X) condition (for a discussion of the strong situation hypothesis, see Cooper & Withey, 2009). 
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 Can the two types of interaction effects be reconciled? Maner et al. (2012) suggested 
that some functional motives may not be generally active such that dispositional differences 
become apparent only under sufficient environmental stimulation (corresponding to the first 
type described above), but that other functional motives may be chronically active such that 
dispositional differences exert effects in everyday situations but not under stronger situations 
(corresponding to the second type described above). Marshall and Brown (2006) proposed 
the traits as situational sensitivities model to account for these two types of interaction effects 
under a single framework. This model proposes that individuals high on a dispositional 
variable have a lower threshold for reacting to situational stimulation, resulting in the 
commonly observed patterns in which high-trait individuals are especially reactive in the 
weak-to-moderate situations range, and low-trait individuals are especially reactive in the 
moderate-to-strong situations range (for clarification, see Marshall & Brown’s [2006] Figure 
1). 
 While Marshall and Brown’s (2006) model represents an important advance in 
understanding these patterns of person × situation interaction effects, the asymmetric 
behavioral homeostasis perspective offers a more direct window into the underlying 
psychological processes. Consider the following thought experiment. Imagine two 
individuals with metabolic heating systems (but no cooling systems), and their internal 
“thermostats” are set at 24°C and 22°C. If the ambient temperature happens to hover around 
22°C, the first individual (set at 24°C) will experience larger and more frequent downward 
deviations, resulting in a more intense and persistent operation of the heating system. In fact, 
variation in temperature set points occurs in human thermoregulation, most notably during 
febrile responses, with the result that a person whose body is attempting to maintain a higher 
temperature will generally feel colder and exhibit more intense output responses to maintain 
the higher body temperature (Maier & Watkins, 1998). If this difference in set points is 
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chronic, then we might speak of individual differences—dispositional differences in “cold 
sensitivity.” Many individual differences can thus be understood as differences in 
homeostatic reference values. When a system is attempting to keep up to a higher reference 
value, it will exhibit output responses more intensely and frequently. 
 Suppose we refer to these two individuals as “high cold sensitive” (set point at 24°C) 
and “low cold sensitive” (set point at 22°C), respectively. How does this “disposition” 
interact with external situations? Suppose that, under experimental conditions, these 
individuals are introduced to ambient temperatures of 25°C, 23°C, and 21°C, and that the 
activity of their metabolic heating system is measured as the DV. Figure 1 depicts the 
hypothetical results (note its close resemblance to Marshall and Brown’s [2006] Figure 1). In 
the 25°C condition, both individuals will experience upward temperature deviations and thus 
exhibit little or no activity. In the 23°C condition, the low-cold-sensitive individual will 
continue to experience mostly an upward deviation and thus exhibit little activity; however, 
the high-cold-sensitive individual will now experience downward deviations and thus exhibit 
greater activity. In the 21°C condition, both individuals will experience downward deviations 
and thus exhibit heightened activity. This thought experiment clarifies why we might observe 
the pattern of person × situation interaction as described by Marshall and Brown (2006). 
“Weak” situations might be those in which individuals of all dispositions do not experience a 
homeostatic disturbance, “moderate” situations might be those in which individuals 
maintaining higher reference values are more likely to experience a homeostatic disturbance, 
and “strong” situations might be those in which individuals of all dispositions experience a 
homeostatic disturbance. For instance, some individuals may maintain larger danger- or 
disease-avoidance buffers than others, resulting in more intense and frequent responses; such 
individuals may be said to be high in trait anxiety or disgust sensitivity. 
Ballistic Processes 
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 While many adaptive responses may hinge on negative-feedback control, there are 
some apparently adaptive behaviors showing little sign of feedback control (Schaller, 2003; 
see also Baumeister, Vohs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007). Rather, these processes operate in a 
manner that might be better described as reflexive, or “ballistic,” meaning that a quick 
response is launched in the correct direction (analogous to a ball being thrown toward a target, 
after which there is no control over its movement). This sort of process gains in speed what it 
loses in accuracy, and it likely coexists with feedback-controlled processes. Darwin (1872) 
provided a vivid example of a response that is best described as ballistic: 
I put my face close to the thick glass-plate in front of a puff-adder in the Zoological 
Gardens, with the firm determination of not starting back if the snake struck at me; 
but, as soon as the blow was struck, my resolution went for nothing, and I jumped a 
yard or two backwards with astonishing rapidity. My will and reason were powerless 
against the imagination of a danger which had never been experienced. (p. 38) 
While it may resemble behavioral homeostatic mechanisms, this sort of instantaneous and 
cognitively impenetrable response does not appear to be characterized by a process involving 
feedback and discrepancy reduction. Nevertheless, the functional asymmetry applies here as 
well. There is a safe distance that must be maintained, and so a sudden reduction in the 
distance is more inciting than a sudden increase in the distance (had the snake made a sudden 
movement away from Darwin, he would not have attempted to jump forward to reduce the 
widened gap). Darwin’s passage also hints at the idea that these mechanisms can be 
evolutionarily prepared toward achieving specific outcomes (i.e., he did not have to learn to 
jump away from a venomous snake). 
 Apart from clear-cut cases, the distinction between homeostatic and ballistic 
processes can be difficult to discern; indeed, many of the behavioral “homeostatic” responses 
discussed above may be better described a ballistic. Importantly, however, there may be 
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multiple layers of feedback control, so that a particular behavioral outcome that appears 
ballistic—and not necessarily feedback controlled toward a genuine goal—at one level may 
be feedback controlled at a higher level. Darwin’s ballistic jumping behavior (which itself is 
not feedback controlled) can be seen as a lower-order behavioral capacity that serves the 
higher-order goal of avoiding potential dangers (which is feedback controlled). Generally, we 
would expect adaptive behaviors to be the result of interlocked combinations of ballistic and 
feedback-controlled processes. 
Conclusion 
 Psychologists have long been interested in examining effects of experimental 
manipulations on immediate psychological and behavioral outcomes, developing a wide array 
of theories and models to account for these effects. The fact that many existing models of 
psychological processes—especially those pertaining to motivation—align well with the 
behavioral homeostasis perspective suggests that the behavioral sciences may be more 
commensurate with the biological sciences than sometimes assumed. Both physiological and 
behavioral homeostatic processes may exhibit a functional asymmetry. An important 
implication for motivational processes, thus far largely unacknowledged, is that simply 
reversing the input cues will not reverse the output responses. This explains why many 
motivation-related responses (not only basic emotions but also more downstream outcomes 
such as heightened prejudices) are easy to dial up but difficult to dial down. How (and how 
much) human psychological process are characterized by asymmetrical homeostatic control 
remains to be more thoroughly elucidated. The present perspective supplies another bridge 
between psychology and physiology, and it highlights the important role that experimental 
psychology plays in mapping the various evolutionary paths to adaptability.  
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Footnotes 
 1Of course, phenotypic plasticity and homeostasis are not alternatives to evolved 
adaptations but are specific instances of them. We are merely highlighting the contrast 
between adaptations that are relatively fixed within individuals and those that permit 
ontogenetic and transitory adaptability. 
 2This usage of the term “negative feedback” should not be confused with the more 
colloquial usage frequently seen in psychology, where the term means something roughly 
equivalent to “criticism” (information that draws attention to one’s flaws and weaknesses). 
 3There are more sophisticated temperature-regulation systems that appear to be “all-
in-one,” with the capacity to both heat and cool; however, beneath the surface, these 
contraptions basically consist of two separate feedback systems packaged together, and they 
will inevitably cost more to manufacture and maintain. In fact, people living in climatic 
regions characterized by both hot and cold extremes (e.g., East Asia) often have two entirely 
separate temperature-regulation systems in their dwellings, if they can afford them. 
 4Carver and Scheier (1998) discussed how feedback systems may be characterized by 
“sloppy” versus “tight” control (p. 15), but they did not go into the issue of asymmetry. 
 5We revisit the issue of maximization versus homeostasis below. 
 6This conjecture is based on the finding that people’s self-esteem scores tend to lie 
well above the midpoint of numerical scales (Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989; though there 
is cross-cultural variation, Schmitt & Allik, 2005). It may thus be the case that people expect 
some level of approval by default (at least among populations characterized by above-neutral 
self-esteem), and downward deviations from that baseline (including feedback constituting 
the “neutral” conditions in experiments) may actually be perceived as cues of disapproval. 
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 7In fact, Leary (2005) used data based on varying levels of feedback (Leary et al., 
1998) to draw inferences regarding how self-esteem responds to rejection/neutral/acceptance 
experiences. Leary’s (2005) Figure 1 shows that the self-esteem gain from acceptance is 
larger than the self-esteem loss from rejection, which contradicts the present asymmetry 
hypothesis. However, then specific inference depends on at which point on the x-axis one 
places the “baseline.” As noted above, the psychological baseline is probably not equivalent 
to neutral feedback but closer to the right end of the axis, which would tend toward the 
opposite conclusion that the self-esteem loss from rejection is larger. 
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Table 1 
Hypothetical Domains of Asymmetric Behavioral Homeostasis 
Controlled variable Disturbance Output 
Buffer against 
pathogens 
 
Heightened threat posed by 
pathogens 
Disgust, aversion, physical 
distancing 
Buffer against 
dangerous people and 
animals 
 
Heightened threat posed by 
people and animals 
Fear, attributions of danger, 
escape 
Social relationships 
and relational value 
Heightened threat of loss of 
relationships 
Low self-esteem, reconnection 
motives 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Hypothetical results of an experiment in which individuals with different 
temperature set points (“high cold sensitive” and “low cold sensitive”) are placed under three 
ambient temperature conditions. The y-axis shows the activity level of their metabolic 
heating systems in hypothetical units. When the ambient temperature is 25°C, neither 
individual activates their heating system; when the ambient temperature is 23°C, only the 
high cold sensitive individual activates the heating system; when the ambient temperature is 
21°C, both individuals activate their heating systems. 
 
